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作者(中文):駱荻茜
作者(外文):Lo, Di Chien
論文名稱(中文):以樣本選擇模型探討企業型態對公司價值影響
論文名稱(外文):Using a sample selection model to analyze the effect of entity type on firm value
指導教授(中文):余士迪
指導教授(外文):Yu, Shih Ti
口試委員(中文):郭啟賢
張焯然
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立清華大學
系所名稱:計量財務金融學系
學號:102071510
出版年(民國):104
畢業學年度:103
語文別:中文
論文頁數:66
中文關鍵詞:企業型態家族企業樣本選擇模型
外文關鍵詞:entity typefamily firmsample selection model
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家族企業在全球的商業體系中扮演著舉足輕重的角色,全世界約有2/3為家族企業,全球的GDP中,更有70%至90%是由家族企業所創造的。在台灣,上市上櫃企業中,家族企業就佔了62.95%,可見家族企業對台灣的經濟也有極大的影響力。
  Amit and Villalonga (2006b) 在假設企業型態為外生變數下,區分家族管理權、所有權及控制權使用多元迴歸探討其對Tobin’s Q值的影響,另外再加入非家族大股東、非家族董事、股利佔帳面權益比重、負債市值比、貝他值、特有風險、R&D佔營收比例、多角化虛擬變數、總資產、營收成長率、公司設立年數、固定資產購置比例以及公司治理指數作為解釋變數。
在本篇研究中,使用台灣1996到2013年,1378間上市上櫃公司,共12509筆資料做為樣本。發現在研究期間,一共有124次公司在家族企業與非家族企業間轉換型態的紀錄,其中有62%轉換後平均三年的Tobin’s Q值較轉換前平均三年要高,另外,在公司價值處於該企業近年來相對低點時轉換公司型態的公司,有77%在轉換型態後公司價值較高;也因此,與Amit and Villalonga (2006b)、Chriaman et al.(2004)以及Demsetz(1983)不同的是,我們認為,是否成為家族企業,並非外生變數而是公司股東內生極大化公司價值的選擇。本篇論文將沿用Amit and Villalonga (2006b)的變數選擇,去除多角化虛擬變數、公司治理指數,並加入股份控制權等變數,使用內外生模型及樣本選擇模型探討企業型態對公司價值的影響。
Family firms play an important role in global economy. There are almost 2/3 business are family firms in the world. And, family firms create average 70% to 90% gross world product every year. Family firms also make big impact on Taiwan’s economy since it occupy a large proportion, 62.95%, in listed and OTC companies.
Amit and Villalonga (2006b) assume entity type is an exogenous variable, and distinguish among three fundamental elements in the definition of family firms, namely, ownership, control, and management to analyze family firms’ value (Tobin’s Q). And use governance index , non-family blockholder ownership, nonfamily outside directors, dividends/book value of equity, debt/market value of equity, market risk (beta), diversification dummy, R&D/sales, CAPX/PPE, assets, sales growth and age as explanatory variables to do multiple regression.
In this paper, we use all listed/OTC companies in Taiwan during 1996 to 2013 to do research. We find that in our study period, there were 124 times that company changed their status between family and non-family firm. Among these, after switched their status, there were 62% companies had greater three years average Tobin’s Q than previous three years. And 77% companies had higher firm value if they changed status when their firm value was in the relative lower point. So, different to Amit and Villalonga (2006b), Chriaman et al.(2004) and Demsetz(1983), we consider entity type is an endogenous variable which determine by the stakeholders who maximum firm value. We continue to use explanatory variables in Amit and Villalonga (2006b), and remove governance index and add voting rights as explanatory variable. Then use endogenous model and sample selection model to analyze the effect of entity type on firm value.
第一章、緒論 1
第一節:研究動機與目的 1
第二節:研究架構 3
第二章、文獻回顧 5
第一節:家族企業價值研究 5
第二節:家族企業的特質與優劣勢 8
第三章、研究模型 11
第一節:內外生性模型 11
第二節:Heckman 兩階段估計法 12
第四章、資料說明 14
第一節:樣本來源 14
第二節:家族企業定義 14
第三節:敘述統計分析 16
第五章、實證結果與分析 21
第一節:模型設定 21
第一項:內外生性模型 21
第二項:Heckman兩階段估計法模型 23
第二節:變數定義 26
第三節:估計結果與分析 28
第一項:內外生性模型 28
第二項:Heckman兩階段估計法模型 37
第六章、結論與建議 50
第一節:研究結論 50
第二節:後續研究之建議 51
附錄 52
參考文獻 62
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